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Abstract  
The author argues that although the collapse of the Doha “Development” Round in early summer 
of 2006 was triggered by the refusal of the United States to agree to the reduction of the ceiling 
on the amount of domestic subsidies paid to the US farmers, there were some fundamental 
reasons behind the failure of the talk related to the contradictions in design and implementation of 
WTO rules to detrimental interests of developing countries. He uses the example of NAMA to 
highlight the inconsistencies between the objectives and spirit of the agreed Doha Text and the 
subsequent proposals made by developed countries during the process of negotiations. He shows 
that these inconsistencies are, in fact, a reflection of the inherent double standards in GATT/WTO 
rules. On the basis of experience of successful industrializers and the failure of recent across-the-
board and universal trade liberalization prescribed by neoliberals, he proposes the necessary 
changes in WTO rules in order to make them conducive to industrialization and development. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this article is to argue that the proposals made by developed countries on 
NAMA (non-agricultural market access) is in clear contradiction with the stated 
objectives and spirit of the Doha Round-or so-called Doha “Development” Round, but it 
is consistent with existing GATT/WTO rules which suffer from numerous contradictions 
to detrimental interests of developing countries. It is true that the collapse of the Round1 
in early summer of 2006 was triggered by the refusal of the United States to agree to the 
reduction of the ceiling on the amount of domestic subsidies paid to the US farmers. 
Nevertheless, there are some fundamental reasons behind the failure of the negotiations, 
related to the contradictions in design and implementation of WTO rules and the 
inconsistencies between the agreed Doha Text and the subsequent proposals made by 
developed countries. We will concentrate on the issues related to NAMA (non-
agricultural market access) as illustration and as a specific case of inconsistencies.  
 To proceed, we will first refer briefly to some general contradictions in 
GATT/WTO rules. Subsequently, the objectives of the Doha Round in the specific area 
of NAMA will be outlined and the inconsistencies of the proposals made by developed 
countries during the negotiation with these objectives will be highlighted. The third 
section will report the historical evidence on the impact of the type of liberalization 
                                                 
1 Mr. Pascal Lamy, the WTO Director General gave the label of “crisis” to the event. Some others thought 
it was a “failure” of the Round as the result of which developing countries would be the main losers. Yet, 
others, particularly a number of NGOs, believed it was a success for development and went on celebration. 
The divergence of views on the collapse of the talks is as wide as the divergence of interests among various 
groups, particularly developed and developing countries, involved in the negotiations.  
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proposed by developed countries on industrialization of developing countries. The last 
section will present some concluding remarks.  
I. General contradictions in GATT/WTO rules 
The dissatisfaction of developing countries with the new “Trade Round” has 
surfaced since the WTO meeting in Seattle in autumn 1999. But as a distinguished Yale 
University Scholar put it: “what Seattle showed was that there is a lot more angst beneath 
the surface”2. This angst is related to that philosophy and the contradictions in the design 
and the implementation of GATT/WTO rules that also manifested themselves during the 
Doha Round, for the negotiation on NAMA.  
To continue, while GATT/WTO trading system aims at trade liberalization, it 
suffers from a number of contradictions which reminds oneself of exceptional clauses of 
the "Animal Farm" story. For example, first of all, according to GATT/WTO rules, the 
power and influence of the government in the flow of international trade has to decline 
through reduction, or elimination, of tariffs and non-tariffs measures. Yet, the power and 
influence of TNCs in international trade is allowed to increase continuously. According 
to table 1, 500 companies accounted for about 70 per cent of world trade around year 
2000. The cross-border mergers and acquisitions which have accelerated since 1996, i.e. 
after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, have also continued their high speed in more 
recent years as shown in table 2.  
The problem is that while the degree of concentration in international markets has 
increased significantly, the governments’ controls on TNCs have been relaxed through 
TRIMs and GATS. According to Robert Wade: 
                                                 
2 Jeffrey Garten, International Herald Tribune, 9 December 1999. 
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These [international] regulations are not about limiting companies’ options, as 
“regulations” normally connotes. Rather they are about limiting the options of 
developing country governments to constrain the options of companies operating or  
 4
  
Table 1: The share of top firms in global production and trade (late 1990s) 
 Activity Number  Per cent 
 
 All output 200  28 
 Industrial output 1000 80 
 World trade 500 70 
Source: Mooney, P.R. (2000), “Concentration in Corporate Power on Coming Binano Republic”, 
Development Dialogue, 1-2:74. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Annual average cross-border mergers and acquisition with value of  
more than $1 billion, 1987-2005 
 
Periods   No. of deals   value ($billion) 
1987-1996    23    49   
1997-2001    110    445   
2002-2004    71    186 
2005     141    454   
Source: Based on UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2006: table1.3. 
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 hoping to operate within their borders. In effect, the new regulations are designed to 
expand the options of developed country firms to enter and exit markets more easily, 
with fewer restrictions and obligations and to lock in appropriation of technological 
rents”3
The large firms coordinate their activities not only outside the market, but they 
also shape the market and create barriers to entry for new comers. They coordinate their 
activities through strategic planning, strategic actions and vertical and horizontal 
relationship with other firms. Further, they have the capacity to influence production 
costs, prices, technology and the quality of goods they produce.  They can target their 
markets; influence the market structure and the environment within which they operate 
thus limiting the entry of new firms to the market. 
The firm level economies of scale of large established firms are, in particular, 
important, not only because they are sources of cost advantage (which are different from 
factor cost advantages), but more importantly, because they are sources of “strategic 
behaviour”, “dynamic competition” and progressive and cumulative changes over time. 
Such a Schumpeterian source of dynamic competitive process and power of “creative 
destruction” implies that the ability to export would depend on “comparative strategic 
advantage” rather than comparative cost advantage alone which is behind the philosophy 
of GATT/WTO rules4
                                                 
3 Wade, R. (2005), “What Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The World Trade 
Organization and Shrinking of Development Space” in Gallagher K.P(ed). (2005), Putting Development 
First, the importance of Policy Space in the WTO and IFIs, (London and New York, ZED Books): 80-101, 
particularly p.80. 
 
4  for more details and references see Shafaeddin (2005), Is Industrial Policy Relevant in the 21st Century 
(Kuwait, Arab Planning Institute) available at www.arab-api.org/c_beirut06_6.pdf: 9-14 
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Secondly, since the inception of GATT, trade in manufactured goods has been 
subject to liberalization in various rounds of trade negotiations, but agricultural products 
have been largely excluded. According to OECD sources, the amount of producers 
support paid in OECD countries in 2004 is estimated to be nearly 280 billion dollars5 
.When export subsidies added to this figure, the total amount of subsidies reaches about 1 
billion dollars a day. The “cotton scandal”, which cost livelihood of a large number of 
populations in rural Africa, is only one example of the problem.  
Thirdly, even in the case of manufactured goods products of interest to 
developing countries have been restricted either under exceptional arrangements (e.g. 
textiles and clothing until recently) or through tariff escalations, safeguard measures and 
arbitrary anti-dumping practices. While the average tariff on industrial goods in 
developed countries is low, tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries 
are relatively high. This is because in the previous trade rounds, developed countries 
“have significantly reduced tariffs on the products of mutual interests among 
themselves”, but continued to maintain higher tariffs on products of export interest to 
developing countries6
Fourthly, According to the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreements, developing 
countries were forbidden to protect, or subsidize selectively, their infant industrial 
exports. Further, the TRIMs forbid theme to impose local content requirement, and 
obliges them to treat local and foreign companies equally-even though they lack equal 
                                                 
5 Based on WTO, World Trade Report, 2006 (Geneva, WTO, 2006):151. 
 
6.Das, B.L.  (2005), The Current Negotiations in WTO, Options, Opportunities and Risks for Developing 
Countries (Geneva, Zed Books and TWN):34 and 36. 
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capabilities. By contrast, developed countries benefit from infant industry protection of 
their new technology for over 20 years through TRIPS.  
Further, developed countries did not fully implemented even those rules to which 
they had agreed in the UR, e.g. in the case of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing7. 
But the double standard is not confined to the case of the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing. There are also many other examples. For instance, targeted exports subsidy and 
industrial policy is restricted by Uruguay Round Agreements (URAs). Nevertheless, it 
still prevails in various forms, including the use of tax holiday and subsidy, in most 
developed countries, including the United States, the most advanced industrial economy:  
It can be argued that while the Washington Institutions stepped up their 
ideological crusade against government intervention in the Second and Third 
Worlds, domestically the US actually increased government assistance to 
business. The Small Business Administration financed 26,000 companies in 1992; 
in 1997, the number of companies receiving subsidised finance from this federal 
office alone had grown to 58000. While the Washington Institutions have 
managed the de-industrialisation of the Second and Third Worlds during the 
1990’s – under the theory that “all economic activities are alike” – within the US 
there is a plethora of government support programs specifically targeting 
manufacturing. Manufacturing industries with investments below 40 million 
dollars are eligible to receive loans at about 50 per cent of prime rate, subsidised 
by the federal government. At the last count, in July 1999, there were 821 
different income tax credit schemes promoting investments in the real economy 
operating in the 50 states of the US8.  
 
 The dispute between the USA and EU on Government subsidization of exports of 
industrial goods by US companies, for which the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of WTO 
gave verdict against the USA Government, is yet another example9. According to an ex-
                                                 
7 See M. Shafaeddin Trade Policy at the Crossroads; the Recent Experience of Developing Countries, 
Palgrave, Macmillan, 2005, chapter 8, for details. 
 
8 Reinert, F. S. (2000), The Other Cannon: The Other Cannon and the History of Economic Policy, Norsk 
Investor Forum and SVN (Oslo, University of Oslo, Centre for Development and Environment):18–19) 
 
9 For details see Shafaeddin, Trade Policy at the Crossroads; op.cit.  
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USA official "… [President] Regan himself, despite his devotion to open market in 
general and free trade in particular, 'granted more import relief to US industry than any of 
his predecessors in more than a century10". 
 Finally, the TRIPs, TRIMs, GATS and ASCM (the Agreement on Subsidy and 
Countervailing Measures) severely limit the policy space of developing countries.11 
Summarizing, the impact of the first three agreements, Wade concludes that: “With a 
touch of hyperbole the agreements could be called a slow-motion Great Train Robbery”12 
Wade (2005) (Ibid: 89). 
In nutshell, while developed countries preach developing countries to liberalize, 
they have tried to avoid it themselves in many cases. The Nobel Prize winner, Professor 
Stiglitz, once said: “I found myself in uncomfortable position of an American saying “do 
as we say, not as we do”. This is the main source of the “angst” behind WTO rules, 
negotiations and practices of developed countries. The case of NAMA is a clear 
reflection of such “angst”. 
 
II. Doha Round Objectives and NAMA 
The development orientation of the Doha Round (henceforth DR) is undeniable if one 
bases his judgment on the stated objectives of the Round as contained in the Doha 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 Bergsten, C. F. (2001), “Fifty Years of Trade Policy: The Policy Lessons”, Journal of World Trade Law, 
1–13, p.8 based on remarks by Treasury Secretary James A. Baker before a conference sponsored by the 
Institute for International Economics (14September, 1987). 
 
11 See Shafaeddin, Is industrial Policy relevant…..Op.cit. 
 
12 Wade, R. (2005), “What Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries today? The World Trade 
Organization and Shrinking of Development Space” in Gallagher K.P(ed). (2005), Putting Development 
First, the importance of Policy Space in the WTO and IFIs, (London and New York, ZED Books):80-101, 
particularly p.89. 
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Ministerial Declaration and its Work Programme. For example according to paragraph 2 
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, “We seek to place their needs [developing countries 
needs] and interests at the heart [our italics] of the Work Programme adopted in this 
declaration”. Similarly, article 6 of the same declaration emphasizes that: “We strongly 
reaffirm our commitment to objective of sustainable development, as stated in the 
preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement”. On the particular issue of NAMA paragraphs 16 
and 50 clearly refers to a number of principals to be followed during the curse of 
negotiation to attain a favourable outcome for developing countries. Accordingly, the 
negotiations shall take fully into account: 
 The special needs and interests of developing and least-developed country 
participants including, 
 Less than full reciprocity in tariff reduction commitments in favour of 
developing countries, 
 The principal of special and differential treatment for developing and least 
developed countries as stated in part IV of the GATT 1994, etc. 
 Reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as 
well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products of export interest to 
developing countries. 
 Generally speaking, GATT/WTO rules and decisions recognize the need to take 
into account the special need of individual developing countries and industries, (e.g. 
Article XXVIIIbis of GATT 1994, para8 of Article XXXVI, part IV, GATT 1994). In the 
particular case of NAMA, which is of our particular interest here, the July 2004 package 
also refers to principles of “less than full reciprocity” and “flexibility” in favour of 
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developing countries (e.g. paragraphs, 3,4 and 8 of Annex B to the text of  the July 2004 
Package)13.  
In practice, however, the proposals made by developed countries are neither 
conducive to development nor consistent with those principles. In fact, right after the 
conclusion of the Doha declaration, developed countries deviated from the objectives of 
the Doha Round by making proposals which were not in the interests of developing 
countries. Such proposals, as contained in the Annex B of the July 2004 decision, were 
pushed through by the chairman of the negotiating group to be sent to the General 
Council despite the opposition by developing countries. Due to the insistence by 
developing countries, the contents of Annex B was, in effect, legally nullified by the 
paragraph 1 of the Annex B which regarded them as issues for further negotiations rather 
than agreed decisions14. Nevertheless,  developed countries have continued, more or less, 
on the basis of their original proposals contained in the remaining articles of Annex B 
(Articles 2-17), until the collapse of the talks.  
 During the negotiations, developed countries have been pushing for across-the-
board and near universal liberalization of trade in manufactured goods. According, all 
countries are supposed to apply the same formula to cut average tariffs rates drastically 
and reduce their dispersion by binding 95 per cent of their individual tariff15 lines at the 
same rate at the low levels.  For example, the USA proposed cutting tariffs to 8 per cent 
                                                 
13  See Khor, M. and Yen, G.C. (2005), “The WTO Negotiation on Non-Agricultural Market Access: A 
Development Perspective” a paper presented to a Workshop on NAMA organized by TWN, Geneva,9 May 
2005 :10-12 for details. 
 
14  See Das, Ibid:29-30. 
 
15  Five per cent of tariff line can be excepted provided the related imports do not exceed 5 per cent of the 
total value of member’s imports (para 8, annex B of the WTO July Package). 
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by 2010 and reducing them to zero by 2015. Certain sectors were proposed to be subject 
to zero tariffs immediately upon the conclusion of the Doha Round. The EU proposed 
non-linear cuts in tariffs according to the Swiss formula16 and a low and uniform 
coefficient of 10 chosen for both developed and developing countries. Their latest 
proposal following the Hong Kong Meeting is to apply coefficients of 15 for developing 
and 10 for developed countries, receptively17. 
 The NAMA negotiation is the most obvious case of inconsistencies between the 
agreed text of the Doha “Development” Round and the proposals made by developed 
countries during the process of negotiations... The magic and complicated Swiss formula 
has a few main characteristics: 
• . the coefficient (e.g. 15), determines the maximum tariff rate possible under the 
formula irrespective of the country’s present tariff rates and level of 
industrialization, 
•  the higher the initial tariff rate, the higher the rate of reduction in tariff, 
•  the lower the coefficient, the higher will be the rate of reduction in tariff, 
•  for high tariff rates the rate of reduction in tariffs is higher than when a simple 
linear formula is applied (in which case the same percentage reduction is applied 
to all tariff lines).  
                                                 
16  The Swiss formula is: T= (a. t)/ (a+t) and R=t/ (a+t) where T and t and a are the new and initial tariff 
rates and constant coefficient, respectively, and R is the rate of tariff reduction  
 
17  It is also proposed that at least 95 per cent of their individual tariff lines be bound.  
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• the formula will lead to lower rates of percentage reduction than those generated 
by a tariff-independent linear reduction in a certain range of low tariff rates18.  
Hence, the Swiss formula with a low coefficient fits the interests of the developed 
countries, while it goes against the developing countries' interests. Initial tariffs for 
developing countries are much higher than those of developed countries. The former 
would be subject to significantly greater reduction in their tariff rates in terms of 
percentage as well as percentage points despite the fact that the principal of less than 
proportional reciprocity, in favour of developing countries, was agreed also in Hong-
Kong. For example, with coefficients of 10 for developed countries, a tariff rate of 5 per 
cent will be reduced to 3.33 per cent-a reduction of 33 percent, but only 1.67 percentage 
point. By contrast, a coefficient of 15 per cent for developing countries will reduce a 
tariff rate of 50 per cent to 11.5 per cent a reduction of 38.5 percentage point and76 per 
cent. 
The application of the proposed coefficients suggested by developed countries 
will have a significant detrimental long-term effect on industrialization of developing 
countries, with no negative effects on developed countries. Developed countries are 
already industrialized; they have the supply capacity to produce capital-intensive, skill-
intensive and technology-intensive goods. By giving up some-in fact in this case small - 
trade barriers on imports in exchange for market access in developing countries, 
developed countries do not sacrifice their long-run industrial development. Of course, 
their upgrading of the industrial sector depends on the development of new technology. 
                                                 
18  For details see Shafaeddin, “Beware of NAMA’s Slippery Slope to Industrialization”, SUNS, 15 June 
2006. available at http://www2.unine.ch/webdav/site/irene/shared/documents/SUNS15-Shafaeddin.pdf
 13
But they have firmly secured protection of their new technologies through the WTO's 
TRIPS Agreement as mentioned above. 
By contrast, the use of tariffs is almost the only remaining trade policy instrument 
for developing countries. Yet the industrial sector of most developing countries is, unlike 
that of developed countries, underdeveloped. Thus, they need to apply higher tariffs to 
some of their industries, particularly new ones. The low and bound tariffs rates being 
proposed will disarm them of an important policy tool for establishing new industries and 
upgrading the existing ones. Clearly, by obtaining further market access in developed 
countries, they will improve the prospects for expanding exports for their existing 
efficient industries, i.e. industries in which they have static comparative advantages. But 
binding tariffs at low levels deprives them of the tool of diversification and expansion of 
supply capacity in new industries in which they may wish to develop dynamic 
comparative advantage. Therefore, even when market access is provided for such 
potential products, the prospects for their supply expansion will be absent due to the lack 
of policy space. In other words, for the sake of better access to markets for their current 
export products, they sacrifice the ability to establish new industries or diversify their 
production structure away from primary commodities or upgrade their manufacturing 
sector into new products. Such a trade-off will result in deepening of their static 
comparative advantage. Robert Wade correctly argues that “International rules should be 
judged against how they assist or hinder production diversification19”, not specialization 
                                                 
19 R. Wade (2006),”How to Change the WTO and Global Policy on Trade and Investment: Gaining 
Acceptance of “Open Economy Industrial Policy” by Hoisting Neoliberalism on its Own Petard”; Note for 
Princeton conference on “Normative and Empirical Evaluation of global Governance”, Feb.16-18, Revised 
4 March, p.8. 
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according to static comparative advantage. Otherwise, whatever efficiency is gained due 
to liberalization will be at the cost of growth and diversification in the long-run. He is 
also correct to say that WTO rules makes the “creative function” of the markets more 
difficult by hindering diversification and upgrading of the production structure in 
developing countries; but encourage industrial upgrading in industrialized countries as 
they “permit industrial policy activism of the kind needed to nurture ‘knowledge-
intensive’ industries and activities” which prevail in developed countries!20. The 
protection of technology intensive industries through TRIPs is a clear example of such 
encouragement as mentioned earlier. 
III. Lessons from History 
In fact, the experience of successful industrializers and premature liberalization in 
colonies and in developing countries, in more recent years, provide us with lessons from 
history indicating that across-the-board and premature liberalization will lead to de-
industrialization21. The experience of successful early and late industrializers indicates 
first of all that with the exception of Hong Kong, no country has managed to industrialize 
without going through the infant industry protection phase, although across-the-board 
import substitution and prolonged protection have also led to inefficiency and failure. 
Secondly, government intervention, both functional and selective, in the flow of 
trade and in the economy in general has played a crucial role in the process of 
                                                 
20  Ibid: 8-9. 
 
21 See M. Shafaeddin, “Is Industrial Policy Relevant in the 21st Century” ; Ibid and “Does Trade Openness 
Favour or Hinder Industrialization and development” a paper presented to the Technical Group Meeting of 
Intergovernmental Group of 24 on International Monetary Affairs, Geneva, United nations, 16-17 March 
2006,.available at www.g24.org/msha0306.pdf. 
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industrialization. In all cases, including Great Britain, industrialization began on a 
selective basis, although to a different degree, and continued in the same manner until the 
industrial sector was consolidated. 
 Thirdly, when their industries matured, they began to liberalize selectively and 
gradually. Therefore, trade liberalization is beneficial after an industry reaches a certain 
level of maturity provided it is done gradually and selectively. In contrast, premature 
trade liberalization, whether during the colonial era or in more recent decades, has had 
disappointing results. For example, when the USA tried to liberalize pre-maturely in 
1847-61, the industrial sector suffered and the country had to revert to protectionism 
against imports from Great Britain. 
 Fourthly, government intervention was not confined to trade; the state intervened 
through other means, directly and indirectly, in particular to promote investment and to 
develop the necessary institutions and infrastructure. Industrialization was also supported 
by attention to and growth in agricultural production. Hence, the issue is not the lack of 
intervention, but the nature and the efficiency of intervention. 
 Fifthly, while different countries did not follow exactly the same path, all learned 
from the experience of others; the USA learned from Great Britain, Germany from the 
USA, Japan from Germany and the Republic of Korea from Japan, etc. 
 Sixthly, all main early industrializers tried to open the markets in other countries 
when their industrial sector matured. In the 19th century, free trade policy was forced on 
the colonies and the 5 per cent rule (according to which 5 per cent was the maximum 
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tariff rate allowed on any import item) was imposed on semi-colonies and independent 
countries through "unequal" bilateral treaties and/or through force (for example, in China, 
after the opium war of 1839-42). 
 Further, the policy space of the colonies, in the 19th century, was further limited 
by England by outlawing high value-added manufacturing activities in the colonies and 
banning the export of competing items from colonies to England22. Instead, production of 
primary products was instituted and promoted. The outcome of the imposition of pre-
mature trade liberalization on the colonies was devastation and led to de-industrialization. 
For example over 90 per cent of textiles industries of India were destroyed as a result of 
liberalization by the colonial power. 
 During recent decades, developing countries have been pushed through 
multilateral organizations and bilateral trade agreements to open their markets. In 
addition, tariff peaks and escalation and arbitrary anti-dumping measures have been 
among the means of restricting imports of high-value added products from developing 
countries. The results of a study, by the author, of about 50 developing countries which 
have undertaken trade liberalization during the 1990s indicates that with the exception of 
East Asia, their trade liberalization has had three main characteristics which are common 
with the proposals of developed countries in NAMA negotiations:  
• Uniformity: i.e. a tendency toward uniform tariff rates for various industries in 
each country;  
                                                 
22 Chang, Ha-Joon (2005.b) Why Developing Countries Need Tariffs; How WTO NAMA Negotiation could 
Deny Developing Countries’ Right to Future, South Centre, Geneva. 
 
 17
• Universality, i.e. application of the same recipe to all countries irrespective of 
their level of industrialization and development;  
• Premature and rapid liberalization. 
The results of this kind of liberalization have been disappointing for most of the 
countries other than those in East Asia. Firstly, only 20 countries, or 40% of the sample, 
have shown high (more than 10% a year) rate of growth of exports of manufactured 
goods. And of these, only in about 10 countries (mostly in East Asia) were high growth 
rates of exports accompanied with increasing or high growth rates of Manufacturing 
Value Added (MVA). MVA is a more important indicator of performance than export, as 
it measures the net output or income accruing to the country, whereas a rise in exports 
could also be accompanied by a corresponding or even higher rise in imports (including 
of inputs that are used in the production of exports).  
Secondly, and more importantly, in fact, in half of the sample countries de-
industrialization took place over 1980-2000. The premature fall in MVA/GDP ratio is 
taken as an indicator of de-industrialization. This ratio declined without recovering to the 
initial level. In many countries industrial employment also suffered severely. 
Thirdly, when exports expanded, this growth was mainly in resource-based industry 
and some assembly operation without much upgrading, except for industries which were 
dynamic during the import-substitution era and were near the stage of maturity, or which 
continued to benefit from some sort of support from the government. The aerospace 
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industry of Brazil is a good example of an industry which was near the stage of maturity 
and benefited from liberalization.  
 Fourthly, even though the relative incentives changed in favour of exports, the 
manufacturing industry suffered from low investment despite a significant increase in 
foreign direct investment in some cases (for example, Brazil). Investment in 
manufacturing suffered because the balance of risk and return turned against the 
manufacturing sector23. 
 The above survey results add to the conclusion that low and uniform bound tariff 
rates, particularly if it tends to zero in the next round, would imply the end of 
industrialization of many developing countries; and it would prevents the upgrading of 
the industrial structure of others. 
 If so, developing countries have not lost anything by the collapse of the talks. 
Further, they will not lose anything if the talks are not resumed, if its resumption is to 
lead to the acceptance of the proposal made by developed countries on NAMA. These 
proposals, if agreed upon, would lock the structure of production and exports of the 
majority of developing countries into primary commodities, simple resource-based and 
labour intensive products and at most assembly operations. The developed countries 
proposals on services and agriculture are not much different as far as development of 
developing countries is concerned.  
One should not confuse ends and means. An agreement, should serve the purpose 
of development, it should not be concluded simply for the sake of having an agreement; 
                                                 
23  For details see Shafaeddin, “Does Trade Openness Favour …”, Ibid. 
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development should not be sacrificed for reaching an agreement. The failure to reach a 
bad or damaging agreement will in fact be a success for development. However, 
developing countries should not accept being bullied to unequal bi-lateral free trade 
agreements either. 
 In developing countries, different industries require different rates of protection 
and different lengths of time for their development. This is because there are differences 
in risks and scales of production involved in different industries which also need different 
length of time and experience for their technological upgrading. Another problem is that 
uniform tariff rates provide different effective rates of protection for various industries, 
depending on their import intensity. For given uniform rates for output and inputs, the 
higher the import intensity, the lower the effective rate of protection. As a result uniform 
rates involve biases against new industries as new industries usually have high import 
intensity. This explains why assembly operations do not easily lead to increases in value 
added. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The Doha Round was supposed to be a Development Round, but in practice, it was 
turned into “market access” round by developed countries in their own favour.  
Developed countries were pushing developing countries to cut tariffs on their industrial 
and agricultural goods, and services substantially and reduce restrictions on activities of 
multinationals in exchange mainly for a slight cut in their tariffs on industrial goods and 
in their domestic supports for agriculture. Therefore, while developed countries would 
gain significant market access in developing countries particularly for manufactured 
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goods, developing countries would lose their policy space to develop their industry in 
accordance with the principal of “dynamic comparative advantage”. Of course, they 
would gain some market access for products for which they have static comparative 
advantage. But it would be at the cost of their diversification and development in the 
long-run. This is the gist of the problem which is also related to the philosophy behind 
GATT/WTO rules based on the Neo-classical static comparative cost advantage theory.  
 As long as the philosophy behind GATT/WTO is not changed and the related 
contradiction are not dealt with “do not hold out hopes for the Doha Round” or fair 
treatment of developing countries in the future. What is needed first of all is that before 
conducting trade negotiation, developing countries should have a clear concept of their 
industrial development strategy and trade policy. This is a necessary condition. However, 
it should be emphasized that any intervention might not serve the purpose of 
diversification and upgrading. For this purpose the decision making capacity of the 
government should improve to enhance the efficiency of its policy making mechanism. 
While a country may learn from the experience of others, it can not copy them; each 
country has its own characteristics which may be different from others to some extent.  
 The sufficient condition is that the rules of the World Trading System should be 
changed in a way that would allow a dynamic and flexible trade policy with dimensions 
of space and time according to which the trade rules would24: 
                                                 
24 For details see Shafaeddin, M. “Towards an Alternative Perspective on Trade and Industrial Policies”, 
Development and Change, (2005) 36.6:1143-1162 and Wade (2006)10-13. 
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¾ Accommodate countries with different levels of industrialization and 
development at each point in time, therefore allowing “Special and Differential 
Treatment” as a rule not as an exception; 
¾ Therefore, the concept of “less than full reciprocity” should be taken more 
seriously as countries are at different levels of development and have different 
needs; 
¾  Allow change of trade policy in each country as the country develops; hence a 
country should be allowed the necessary policy space for both selective infant 
industry protection and gradual and selective liberalization, when an industry 
reaches near maturity;  
¾ For liberalization of the tariff structure, flexibility would dictate that only average 
tariffs (which may be even higher than the current average rate) are bound with 
significant dispersion; 
¾ Permit the use of export performance requirements by developing countries in 
TRIMS; 
¾ Let easier transfer of technology to developing countries by changing TRIPS 
Agreement and revising Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement and 
GATS to provide more policy space for developing countries. 
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 Of course, such a re-conceptualization of the trading system will not take place 
over night, but it eventually need to happen25. The problem, according to C. Barshefsky, 
the former US trade representative, at the moment is that "the developing world is not 
hearing what we are saying and we’re not hearing what developing world is saying. We 
are passing [each other] like ships in the night". Yet developing countries are often 
blamed for the lack of progress in the trade talks.  There is no need to put first priority on 
concluding the negotiations simply to avoid blame for the "failure", if the results of the 
negotiations are a recipe for their countries' de-industrialization. But the failure of talks 
should not lead to the acceptance of unfavourable bilateral agreements, which are often 
more stringent than multilateral agreements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 See Helleiner, G. K. "Markets, Politics and globalization: Can the Global Economy be Civilized?", 10th 
Raul Prebisch Lecture, Geneva, UNCTAD, 2005 
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